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During the survey period Texas courts handed down numerous deci-
sions involving various rules of evidence. The cases of greatest interest
were in the following substantive areas: (1) the hearsay rule and its excep-
tions; (2) the dead man's statute; (3) privilege; (4) impeachment; (5) ex-
pert opinion evidence; (6) probative value; and (7) evidence of gross
negligence.
I. THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
.4. Personal Knowledge
To be admissible, the testimony of a lay witness must ordinarily be
based on personal knowledge.' The failure to honor so fundamental a
concept was illustrated recently in Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso.2 In
Elizarraras the drawer of a check brought suit to recover damages for the
failure of the bank to honor his check. The plaintiff, a citizen of Mexico,
wrote a check for $64,000 payable to a Mexican bank. Upon notification
of a $756.68 shortage in his account, the plaintiff immediately deposited
that sum. He also explained to the vice president of the defendant bank
the importance of not having the $64,000 check returned for insufficient
funds, since in Mexico a return would involve both a penalty and a loss of
credit. According to the plaintiff, he was assured by the officer that there
would be no problem. Thereafter, and without giving notice to the plain-
tiff, the bank returned the $64,000 check for insufficient funds. After a jury
trial, the plaintiff was awarded $75,000 for loss of credit and damage to his
reputation, $12,800 for the penalty the Mexican bank had charged him,
and $2,000 for the interest on the $64,000 still owed to the Mexican bank.
The bank appealed the judgment.
The bank contended on appeal that the evidence necessary to support
the award of damages was improperly admitted, and therefore, the evi-
* LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston,
Texas.
1. Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tex. 1965); Hughes v. State, 508 S.W.2d
167, 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Rule 602 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence codified this well-established principle. Rule 602 expressly provides that
"[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EVID. 602. See also Park,
McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay" 4 CriticalAnalysis Followed by Sugges-
tions to Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 423 (1981).
2. 631 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980).
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dence was insufficient to support the judgment. At trial the plaintiff testi-
fied: "I paid the $64,000; then $12,800 and twenty-three and something
else."'3 Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a witness
may not testify to a matter unless the evidence is sufficient to support the
finding that he has personal knowledge of that particular matter.4 Con-
cerning the penalty and interest about which he testified in Elizarraras, the
plaintiff was not testifying to any act of payment he actually made; rather,
he testified that his account had been charged $12,800 and $2,000. The
court of appeals held that this was "not an instance where one can infer
personal knowledge from the testimony itself." The court reasoned that
the only basis the plaintiff had for his testimony concerning the payment of
the penalty and the interest was the Mexican bank officer's oral statements;
those statements, however, had been excluded as hearsay. 6 The admission
of this testimony was deemed harmful to the defendant, and, therefore, the
judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial.7
B. Business Records
Article 3737e provides a statutory exception to the hearsay rule for busi-
ness records.8 With the continued development of information manage-
ment techniques, questions relating to the admissibility of computer data
and the application of article 3737e will undoubtedly increase. Illustrative
of this problem is Voss v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ,9 a suit on a
sworn account. The trial court admitted into evidence a computer printout
establishing the amount and the services for which defendant was billed,
and granted judgment for the plaintiff phone company.
Some Texas courts have indicated that in order to satisfy the requisites
of article 3737e, a party seeking to introduce computer documents must
prove, in addition to the statutory element, that the particular computer
3. Id at 373.
4. FED. R. EvID. 602. "Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not,
consist of the testimony of the witness himself." Id The rule is subject to evidentiary rules
concerning expert opinion testimony. See id 703.
5. 631 F.2d at 374. The court stated that an example of inference of personal knowl-
edge could be drawn from a statement such as "I saw X in the room." Id at 374 n.21.
6. Id at 374.
7. The $75,000 award for loss of credit and reputation damage was also reversed and
remanded. Id at 377.
8. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, § I (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall, insofar as rele-
vant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of the act of event or the exist-
ence of the condition if the judge finds that:
(a) It was made in the regular course of business;
(b) Itwas the regular course of that business for an employee or represen-
tative of such business with personal knowledge of such act, event or condition
to make such memorandum or record or to transmit information thereof to be
included in such memorandum or record;
(c) It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition or reason-
ably soon thereafter.
For a discussion of the type of business that may qualify under this statutory exception, see
Note, The Hearsay Rule and the Business Entries Exception, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 700 (1974).
9. 610 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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equipment used is recognized as standard equipment, that the records are
prepared by persons who understand the operation of the equipment, and
that the operators of the equipment are engaged in their regular duties of
employ.10 In Voss the defendant contended that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the judgment because the plaintiff had failed to prove the
elements noted above. The defendant's witness at trial testified that he was
the supervisor of the billing department, that the bills in question were
prepared in the regular course of business by employees with personal
knowledge of the entries, and that they were prepared at or near the time
of the events reflected therein."l The court of civil appeals held that the
witness's testimony satisfied the requirements of article 3737e, and there-
fore, the computer printout exhibits were admissible. The court reasoned
that the witness's lack of knowledge "as to the type of computer used, its
acceptability in the community and the expertise of the operator of the
equipment are all matters that go to the weight of the evidence, not the
admissibility."12
C. Res Gestae
Although a res gestae statement in the form of an opinion or conclusion
generally is inadmissible, ' 3 factual statements usually are admissible in the
event that the requisites of the res gestae rule are satisfied. As a general
rule, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule permits the admissibility
of factual declarations or exclamations uttered by the parties to a transac-
tion (1) that are contemporaneous with the transaction and calculated to
throw light upon the motives and intentions of the party, and (2) that are
made under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable presumption that
they are the spontaneous utterances of thoughts created by the transaction
itself and so soon thereafter as to exclude the presumption that they are the
10. O'Shea v. International Business Machs. Corp., 578 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.re.), Railroad Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 468
S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, writ refd n.r.e.). In Railroad Comm'n v.
Southern Pac. Co., the Texas Supreme Court refused a writ of error with the notation "no
reversible error," expressly stating that it was not passing upon the holding of the court of
civil appeals as to the admissibility of the computer printout. See generally Comment, The
Admirssibility of Computer Printouts under the Business Record Exception in Texas, 12 So.
TEX. L. 291 (1971).
11. 610 S.W.2d at 538.
12. Id at 539. Emphasizing that the requirements of admissibility in this area are
clearly defined by statute, the court refused to supplement the standard with additional ad-
missibility prerequisites. Consequently, the precedential effects of those cases cited in note
10 supra have been seriously undercut.
13. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Plains Transp. Co., 367 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1963) (per curiam)
(employee's statements that collision was his fault "pure conclusion and opinion" and there-
fore inadmissible). Some case law, however, indicates a trend away from this rule. In Gon-
zalez v. Layton, 429 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ), the
court held that the witness's statement as to "fault" was properly excluded because it failed
to meet the requirements of the res gestae rule. The court stated: "[i]t seems clear that the
modern text writers and courts are leaning toward the admission of such opinion statements
where they are spontaneous, a part of the res gestae, and encouched in language setting forth
a shorthand rendition of the facts, or are used for an impeachment purpose.' Id
1982]
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result of premeditation or design. 14
The applicability of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule was in-
volved in Employers Casualty Co. v. Peterson 15 when the plaintiffs brought
suit to recover under a homeowner's policy for the loss of certain jewelry.
The evidence demonstrated that one of the plaintiffs asked a jeweler to sell
a diamond ring and diamond earrings for him. The jeweler picked up the
jewelry and gave the plaintiff a receipt listing the items and stating the
plaintiffs opinion as to the value of each item. 16 When the jeweler was
unable to return the jewelry or pay the plaintiffs the price for which he
supposedly sold it, the plaintiffs brought suit against Employers Casualty,
the insurer, claiming a "loss" under their homeowner's policy. Employers
Casualty subsequently impleaded the jeweler as a third-party defendant.
The jeweler was called as a witness at trial, but he refused to testify, claim-
ing his privilege against self-incrimination. The defendant then offered
into evidence the testimony of both an investigating police officer and a
representative of the defendant insurance company concerning various
conversations with the jeweler in which the jeweler had told each of the
witnesses that he had sold the plaintiffs' jewelry for a total of $10,600 and
that the plaintiffs had refused to take $9,800 for the ring. The trial court
excluded this testimony, and after a jury trial, the court rendered a verdict
in the plaintiffs' favor for $19,400, and awarded Employers Casualty in-
demnity against the jeweler. 17
On appeal the defendant insurance company argued that the trial court
had erred in refusing to admit the excluded testimony. In affirming the
decision of the trial court, the court of civil appeals rejected the defend-
ant's evidentiary assertion that the witnesses' testimony was admissible
under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. The court concluded
that the first condition for application of the res gestae exception was not
satisfied because the statements were not made in connection with an act
pertinent to the issues, and the statements were made after the transaction
involved, and thus failed to raise a presumption of spontaneity.
18
D. Judicial Admissions
A "judicial admission" has long been defined in Texas as a statement
14. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schlakzug, 143 Tex. 264, 183 S.W.2d 709
(1945); City of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944); Texas Interurban
Ry. v. Hughes, 53 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, judgmt adopted); Knapik v. Edison
Bros., 313 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, writ ref'd).
15. 609 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
16. The receipt listed the value of the ring at $9,800 and the earrinos at $850. At the
bottom of the receipt was the printed phrase "to be sold at the agreed prices above." Id at
583.
17. Id at 584.
18. The defendant claimed that the statements were admissible as res gestae to explain a
business transaction. The court distinguished Olvey v. Jones, 137 Tex. 639, 648, 156 S.W.2d
977, 982 (1941), which held that conversations between the parties while a business transac-
tion was being arranged were admissible as part of the res gestae, on the basis that the




that: (1) is made during the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) is con-
trary to an essential fact embraced in the theory of recovery or defense
asserted by the party against whom it is admitted; (3) is deliberate, clear,
and unequivocal and not merely contradictory of other statements or testi-
mony by the party;' 9 and (4) relates to a fact upon which a judgment in
favor of the opposing party may be based.20 A judicial admission is a
"waiver of proof" as to the fact admitted, is conclusive proof of that fact,
and may not be controverted. 2' While affidavits, agreed statements of
facts, and stipulations all constitute judicial admissions, 22 currently unset-
tled is whether deposition testimony23 or interrogatory answers 24 consti-
tute judicial admissions.
A judicial admission constitutes a waiver of proof of the admitted fact
only in the proceeding in which it is made, or perhaps in a subsequent
proceeding involving the same parties.25 A conclusion or opinion of an
19. Robinson v. Ashner, 364 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1963) (statement equivocal); Dallas Ry.
& Terminal Co. v. Gossett, 156 Tex. 252, 294 S.W.2d 377 (1956) (statement not clear or in
positive terms); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Coker, 146 Tex. 190, 195, 204 S.W.2d 977, 980
(1947) (testimony not clear, definite, and unequivocal); Starks v. City of Houston, 448
S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (testimony
merely contradictory of other testimony).
20. See, e.g., Tex-Wis Co. v. Johnson, 534 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1976); Griffin v. Superior
Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 338 S.W.2d 415 (1960); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v.
Murphy, 537 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); and
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Carr, 242 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio
1951, writ refd).
21. See, e.g., Gevinson v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 449 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. 1969); Griffin v.
Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 338 S.W.2d 415 (1960); Putnam v. Sanders, 537 S.W.2d 308
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ). See general IA R. RAY, TExAs LAW OF Evi-
DENCE § 1127 (Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980). An "extra-judicial admission" is one which,
although admitted into evidence, is not conclusive. Id. Testimonial declaration of a party
normally will not be given the effect of a "judicial admission" if it merely contradicts other
portions of his testimony. Stafford v. Wilkinson, 157 Tex. 483, 487, 304 S.W.2d 364, 366
(1957) (extra-judicial admission not conclusive).
22. See, e.g., Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill County, 425 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1968), afl'd, 436 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1969) (affidavit); W.T. Burton Co. v. Keown Contracting
Co., 353 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, writ refd n.r.e.) (agreed statement of
facts and stipulations); Thompson v. Graham, 318 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1958, writ refd n.r.e.) (stipulations). But see Wilkins v. Cook, 454 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1970, writ refd n.r.e.) (court held defendant's stipulation of liability, with-
drawn after plaintiffs amended his complaint, not a judicial admission).
23. Parrott v. Garcia, 428 S.W.2d 476, 477-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), af'd, 436
S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1969) (deposition testimony constitutes judicial admission); Kulms v. Jen-
kins, 557 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (extra-judicial state-
ments not conclusive); Panola County Comm'r's Court v. Bagley, 380 S.W.2d 878, 885 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, writ refd n.r.e.) (contradictions prevented summary judg-
ment); Southern Lloyds v. Jones, 345 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, no
writ) (inconsistencies prevented summary judgment); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Freeman, 336
S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ refd n.r.e.) (statements constitute
only out of court admissions that may be explained, modified, or contradicted at trial.)
24. Richards v. Boettcher, 518 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ
refd n.r.e.) (do not constitute admissions); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 510 S.W.2d 370,
378 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (do not constitute
admissions).
25. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wells, 557 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977),
writ re'd n.r.e per curiam, 566 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1978) (basis for judicial admission or judi-
cial estoppel not established).
19821
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attorney, however, will not constitute a judicial admission. 26 Since judicial
admissions are conclusive against the admitting party, and may not be dis-
puted by evidence or otherwise, judgment may be granted against that
party on the basis of the judicial admissions alone. 27
The issue of whether the statement of a party's counsel constituted a
judicial admission arose in Charter Medical Corp. v. Miller.28 The plain-
tiffs brought suit alleging that the three defendants conspired to interfere
with their practice of podiatry and with their contractual relations with
their patients. Judgment was entered in the plaintiffs' favor and the de-
fendants appealed. One of the defendants' complaints on appeal was the
admission into evidence of statements from a previous unrelated case
made by their counsel in the instant suit. Two of the plaintiffs had been
defendants in a prior medical malpractice suit. At trial the plaintiffs had
been allowed to testify that in the prior suit the defendants' counsel had
referred to the plaintiffs as "butchers" and threatened to do all in his
power to drive them from practice. The defendants objected to the admis-
sion of this testimony on the ground that the statements had been made in
a judicial proceeding, and therefore, were absolutely privileged. The de-
fendants also argued that the statements constituted hearsay as opposed to
a judicial admission. Conversely, the plaintiffs argued the statements were
justifiably admitted in an attempt to display malice and ill will. The court
of civil appeals did not agree that the prior statements were absolutely
privileged because the applicable privilege extended only to statements
that would form the foundation for a subsequent suit for libel or slander.
The court agreed, however, that the prior statements of defendants' coun-
sel constituted hearsay, stating that it was "not aware of any legal theory
upon which any litigant could be held to ratify prior, unsworn statements
of his counsel in an unrelated case merely by employing him a subsequent
trial."'29 Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and re-
manded the case because the admission of the testimony had been prejudi-
cial to the defendants, and prevented them from receiving a fair trial.30
In Drake Insurance Co. Y. King3' the ownership of a trust was in dispute,
and one of the issues was whether a statement made in a prior pleading
constituted a judicial admission. One of the intervenors, Finley, argued
that another party's original petition in intervention contained a judicial
admission that the party that sold the truck in question to Finley was the
26. Hochmetal Africa (PTY), Ltd. v. Metals, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
27. See, e.g., Gevinson v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 449 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. 1969); Griffin v.
Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 338 S.W.2d 415 (1960); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. State,
136 Tex. 5, 145 S.W.2d 569 (1940), modifying, 136 Tex. 5, 133 S.W.2d 767 (1939); Mobil Oil
Co. v. Dodd, 515 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Carr, 242 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1951, writ
ref d).
28. 605 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
29. Id at 953.
30. Id.
31. 606 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1980).
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owner of the vehicle. This statement, which corroborated Finley's chain of
title, was admitted into evidence. The trial court concluded that Finley
had good title to the truck, and that he sold the truck to another person in
the good faith belief that he was the owner. The trial court nevertheless
entered judgment for the defendant in his cross-action against Finley in
the amount of $2,000. The court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment as
to the party that purchased the truck from Finley, but reversed the defend-
ant's cross-action judgment for $2,000 against Finley.32
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals holding
that the intervenor's original petition was superseded by an amended peti-
tion, and therefore no longer constituted a pleading in the case. 33 The
court stated that the evidence demonstrated that the intervenor had filed
two amended petitions in intervention, alleging that it had received its title
to the truck by transfer not from Finley but yet another party. The origi-
nal petition, having been superseded, "was no longer a judicial admission,
but must be introduced into evidence as any other admission before...
considered as evidence."' 34 Accordingly, the court found that since the sale
of the truck to Finley was void, Finley had no title to transfer to the other
party.35
In Thomas v. St. Joseph Hospital,36 a wrongful death case, the trial court
directed a verdict in favor of Whitehouse, a hospital gown manufacturer,
and third-party defendants, two other hospital gown suppliers, because the
plaintiffs failed to establish precisely who had manufactured the gown in-
volved in the death. 37 On appeal the plaintiff complained that the trial
court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Whitehouse, claiming
there was sufficient evidence to raise the issue of whether that company
had manufactured the gown in question.38 The plaintiff contended that
Whitehouse had judicially admitted that it was the manufacturer. In pre-
trial discovery, the defendant hospital had stated in answers to interrogato-
ries that only the Whitehouse Company had supplied gowns during the
relevant time period. Subsequently, Whitehouse filed a third-party action
against its supplier. When the supplier filed its special appearance and
answer, Whitehouse responded, admitting that it had manufactured the
gown. The statement was based, however, on the information previously
provided by the hospital, information that was peculiarly within the
knowledge of the hospital. The plaintiff claimed the statement was a judi-
cial admission by Whitehouse. The hospital later amended its interro-
gatory answers to state that another company had also supplied gowns to it
during the relevant period, thus refuting its earlier unequivocal knowledge
32. Id at 814.
33. Id. at 817.
34. Id.
35. Id at 817-18.
36. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
37. Id The decedent's hospital gown had ignited when he dropped a lighted match. Id
38. Neither the nurses who testified nor the treating physician were able to determine
who actually manufactured the gown. Id at 794.
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of the specific gown manufacturer. Whitehouse then filed a supplemental
third-party action against its other supplier and specifically abandoned its
earlier admission. The court of civil appeals held that the initial pleading
by Whitehouse was based upon erroneous information furnished by the
hospital, was thereafter amended and modified to reflect the correct facts,
and therefore, did not constitute a judicial admission. 39
E. Survey Evidence
The leading Texas case considering the admissibility of public opinion
polls or surveys is Texas Aeronautics Commission v. Brani#Airways, Inc. 40
The supreme court in Branif held that it was error to exclude a poll or
survey of air travelers' attitudes toward a proposed new air service. 4' The
court noted that the evidence demonstrated that (1) the survey director
was experienced, (2) other interviewers were available for examination at
trial, and (3) the other party knew of the proposed use of the poll at trial
and had an opportunity before trial to conduct investigations as to the sur-
vey's methodology and execution; therefore the court held the poll or sur-
vey was admissible as either "nonhearsay or within the state of mind
exception of the hearsay rule."
42
The admissibility of a public opinion survey was raised during the last
year in Lubbock Radio Paging Service, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. 43 The trial court sustained the orders of the Public Utility Commis-
sion that granted certificates of public convenience and necessity to the
telephone company. 44 The appellants complained on appeal of the admis-
sion of testimony by a professional researcher with twelve years' experi-
ence, who testified in support of Bell's applications to furnish different
areas of the state with radio paging services. The witness had been com-
missioned by Bell to conduct studies designed to support the application
by demonstrating the need for such service in those areas. The appellants
objected to the survey conducted and described by the witness because it
relied on the opinion of another expert as to the size of the sample of
individuals to be contacted in each survey.45 The survey was also attacked
as being too remote since it was conducted two years prior to the hearing.
The court of civil appeals disposed of the appellants' first objection, that
the witness's opinion was based on the opinion of another expert, by hold-
ing that the basic data relied upon by the witness in her testimony was the
information obtained by her in the survey conducted under her direction.
46
39. Id.
40. 454 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1971).
41. Id. at 203.
42. Id
43. 607 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Id at 31.
45. The witness testified that her employer desired a 95% reliability factor in each sur-
vey, and she therefore sought the advice of the other expert to confirm her own determina-
tion of size. Id at 31.
46. Id at 32.
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The information provided to her by the other expert had no bearing upon
that evidence, the court stated, since it only went to the size of the sample
and not its results. To dispose of the appellants' second objection, the
court found that the factors considered important in Branif were present,
and that the appellants' objections therefore went to the weight of the evi-
dence and not its admissibility. 47 In addition, as in Braniff, the expert had
testified in person, thus providing a full opportunity for cross-examination
of such testimony.
F Declarations by Agent
A hearsay statement by an agent or employee is admissible as an admis-
sion against his principal or employer if it was related to and made con-
temporaneously with an act within the agent's or employee's authority.48
A hearsay statement of an agent or an employee is also admissible against
his principal if he has express authority to make the statement.49
In Union Carbide Corp. v. Burton50 the plaintiff was awarded damages
as a result of injuries sustained when a RH-5 degree wheel on a truck
owned by Union Carbide explosively separated as the plaintiff was at-
tempting to place a tire gauge on the stem of a tire. Union Carbide com-
plained on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to admit into
evidence a letter by the assistant counsel for the third-party defendant
Firestone. The defendant contended that the letter reflected the official
position of Firestone, that regular and periodic maintenance of the RH-5
degree rim was necessary, and was inconsistent with the position taken by
Firestone and its expert witness at trial. Union Carbide argued that the
letter was an admission against Firestone's interest made by an agent of
Firestone within the scope of his express or implied authority. In rejecting
this contention, the court of civil appeals stated that the hearsay statement
of an agent may be received against his principal as an admission against
interest only if the trial court first determines that the statement was au-
thorized by the principal. Firestone had denied the authority of the wit-
ness to speak for the company regarding the RH-5 degree wheel, and, in
47. The court also relied on Slaughter v. Abilene State School, 561 S.W.2d 789, 791
(Tex. 1977), which held that a witness's testimony is admissible even though it is partially
predicated upon hearsay.
48. See, e.g., Big Mack Trucking Co. v. Dickerson, 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973) (state-
ment inadmissible because made after authorized act); Le Sage v. Pryor, 137 Tex. 445, 154
S.W.2d 446 (1941) (statement inadmissible since it did not relate to acts within agent's au-
thority); Waggoner v. Snody, 98 Tex. 512, 85 S.W. 1134 (1905) (statement inadmissible since
made prior to authorized act to which it related); Garcia v. Sky Climber, Inc., 470 S.W.2d
261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statement inadmissible
since it did not relate to matter within agent's authority).
49. See, e.g., West Tex. Produce v. Wilson, 120 Tex. 35, 34 S.W.2d 827 (1931) (state-
ments made to police after accident admissible since principal specifically referred officers to
agent for answers); Earthman's, Inc. v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ) (absent support of authority, testimony of witness that some of
defendants had made admissions was inadmissible); Presidential Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun,
325 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statements made by corpo-
rate officer concerning matters under his charge admissible against the corporation).
50. 618 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the absence of any other evidence showing the existence of such authority,
the court of civil appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to admit the letter into evidence. 5'
Similarly, in Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. 52 the
defendant appealed a judgment in favor of several feed lot operators for
the unpaid price of cattle purchased by a buyer, who was found to be the
defendant's agent. The jury found that the relationship between Heller,
the purchaser of cattle, and the defendant meat packer was one of agent-
principal and not one of dealer-purchaser. A witness, Randa Shade, was
permitted to testify as to Heller's conversations with an official of the de-
fendant dealing with Heller's purchases of cattle for the defendant. The
defendant argued that the testimony of Randa Shade was inadmissible be-
cause it was an out-of-court declaration of an alleged agent offered to
prove the existence of an agency relationship. The trial court found, how-
ever, that the testimony was admissible as impeachment evidence to con-
tradict Heller's previous testimony concerning those same conversations.
Moreover, the court had expressly instructed the jury to limit its considera-
tion to the impeachment purpose. 53
Texas law is well-settled that out-of-court declarations of an alleged
agent are not competent proof of the existence of the agency relationship. 54
An out-of-court utterance must have two characteristics before it is ren-
dered inadmissible as hearsay, however. First, the utterance must be a
"statement," and secondly, it must be offered to prove the truth of the mat-
ter it asserts.55 The court of appeals in Lubbock Feed Lots noted that ver-
bal or nonverbal "conduct when ...offered as a basis for inferring
something other than the matter asserted" 56 was to be excluded from the
hearsay rule. Verbal conduct, as opposed to verbal assertions, therefore,
could be admitted into evidence because it was not assertive and because it
was not intended to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The court of
civil appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment and held that it need not
determine whether the verbal conduct in question amounted to a prohib-
ited out-of-court declaration by the agent because it concluded that the
testimony was admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment by con-
tradiction expressed by the trial court.57
G. Visual Aids
- Visual aids used at trial normally are not considered as evidence be-
cause they do not constitute proof of any facts; they are merely tools used
51. Id at 415.
52. 630 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1980).
53. Id at 261.
54. See, e.g., Porter v. Thalman, 516 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
writ refd n.r.e.) (attorney's statement regarding construction of deed inadmissible).
55. Eg., 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE $ 801(c)[01] (1981).
56. 630 F.2d at 262.
57. Id at 263.
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by trial counsel.58 Nevertheless, in Speler v. Webster College59 the issue
presented was whether the admission into evidence of a chart summarizing
testimony constituted reversible error. The chart reflected the oral testi-
mony of the plaintiff policemen as to damages. The plaintiffs' attorney
prepared the chart and placed it within the jury's view. The chart listed
the eleven policemen-plaintiffs with six blank spaces beside each name.
After each policeman testified as to his damages, the attorney would fill in
the figure reflecting the individual policeman's testimony in the appropri-
ate blank space on the chart. At the end of the trial, the trial court admit-
ted the chart into evidence and allowed the jury to take the chart with
them into the jury room during deliberation.60 The trial court entered
judgment for the plaintiffs on the jury verdict, but the court of civil appeals
reversed and remanded on the basis that the admission of the chart into
evidence was reversible error.61
Relying on its decision in Champlin Oil & Refining Co. v. Chastain,62
which held that the admissibility of charts and diagrams designed to sum-
marize the testimony of witnesses was within the discretion of the trial
court, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals. The
court's rationale was that in order to expedite trials and to aid juries in
recalling the testimony of witnesses, such summaries are "useful and often-
times essential. ' 63 The court held that to find error in this case, it would
have been necessary to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the chart into evidence, and the court refused to reach such a
conclusion. 64
In an attempt to exclude the chart, the defendant had relied on Harvey v.
State, in which the admission of a chart into evidence was held to be er-
ror.65 The supreme court sought to reconcile Harvey first by stating that it
agreed with the judgment of the court of civil appeals in Harvey that, al-
though error had been committed, the appellant had failed to carry the
burden of demonstrating that the error probably caused the rendition of an
improper judgment. The court then explained that "[t]he fact that a chart
happens to summarize testimony on damages does not remove its admissi-
bility from the discretion of the trial court."'66 Nevertheless, the court was
forced to recognize that certain language in the Harvey opinion conflicted
58. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 21, § 1465.
59. 616 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1981).
60. The supreme court stated that the issue of whether the trial court erred in permitting
the jury to take the chart with them into the jury room "is not before this Court. There was
no objection in the trial court and no point of error in the briefs challenging its presence in
the jury room." 616 S.W.2d at 618 n.2. The court intimated, however, that allowing the
chart into the jury room would not have constituted error even if the point had been raised.
Id
61. Id at 618.
62. 403 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. 1965).
63. 616 S.W.2d at 618. This approach assumes that the summarized testimony is admis-
sible and already before the jury. Id
64. Id at 619.
65. 389 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. 616 S.W.2d at 619.
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with its holding in Champlin Oil. The court, therefore, expressly disap-
proved the language in Harvey to the extent of any conflict. 67
II. DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
The dead man's statute 68 is a statutory exception to the general rule that
parties to a lawsuit are competent to testify about the matters in dispute.69
Its purpose is to exclude the testimony of a living party pertaining to a
transaction with or a statement by a decedent whose death prevents rebut-
tal.70 The rule does not, however, prohibit a party from testifying from
personal knowledge arising other than from a transaction with or state-
ment by the decedent. 7' Furthermore, since the dead man's statute serves
to exclude otherwise competent testimony of a party merely because it per-
tains to a transaction with or statement by the decedent, the courts have
strictly construed the statute. 72 Consequently, there are numerous deci-
sions in which parties have been able to circumvent the restrictive effect of
the statute by demonstrating that the objecting party waived its
applicability.73
In Lewis v. Foster74 a breach of contract suit, the trial court permitted
the plaintiff to testify as to his transactions with the decedent-defendant.
The plaintiff, who was in the cattle business, had entered into an oral
agreement with Mrs. Foster, the owner of a large ranch, under which she
was to furnish water free of charge for the plaintiff's cattle because he had
no water supply for the pasture he had leased. Subsequently, the plaintiff
was advised that Mrs. Foster would require all of the water her land could
produce for her own ranching purposes and that she could no longer pro-
vide free water to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then sold his cattle and did
not use the leased pasture for the remainder of his lease. He later filed suit
seeking to recover damages. Mrs. Foster died after the suit was filed and
67. Id
68. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926) provides:
In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which
judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the others as to any transaction with, or statement
by, the testator, intestate or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the oppo-
site party; and the provisions of this article shall extend to and include all
actions by or against the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent arising out
of any transaction with such decedent.
69. Adams v. Barry, 560 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. 1978).
70. See Walker, The Dead Man's Statute, 27 TEX. B.J. 315 (1964).
71. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 405 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), writ
refdn.r.e per curiam, 407 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1966) (beneficiaries under a lost will permitted
to testify concerning contents of the instrument).
72. Adams v. Barry, 560 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. 1978); Harper v. Johnson, 162 Tex. 117,
124, 345 S.W.2d 277, 280 (1961); Pugh v. Turner, 145 Tex. 292, 298, 197 S.W.2d 822, 825
(1947); Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 142 Tex. 476, 481, 179 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1944).
73. See, e.g., Green v. Hale, 433 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1970); Mueller v. Banks, 273 S.W.2d
88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ refd n.r.e.); Smith v. Smith, 257 S.W.2d 335
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1953, writ refd n.r.e.); Merriman v. Lary, 205 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1947, writ refd n.r.e.).
74. 621 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1981).
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her executor was substituted as a party. At trial, objection was made to the
introduction of any testimony from the plaintiff concerning his agreement
with Mrs. Foster on the basis of the dead man's statute. The objection was
overruled. Deposition testimony of Mrs. Foster, which had been obtained
prior to her death, was read into evidence by the plaintiff. Her testimony
admitted the existence of an oral agreement, but explained that she was to
have continued to furnish water only so long as she did not need it herself.
The plaintiff testified, however, that he had an agreement with Mrs. Foster
to furnish him water for a period of three years, the same period as his
pasture lease. The jury concluded that the decedent had an agreement to
furnish the plaintiff water for three years, and the trial court entered judg-
ment for the plaintiff.75
The court of civil appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, ruling
the introduction of such oral evidence violated the dead man's statute. 76
The court's analysis began with the conclusion that the statute was violated
in this particular case "unless there was a waiver."'7 7 Further, the court
stated there were two common methods of establishing waiver under the
dead man's statute: (1) when the party to a transaction with the deceased
was called to testify by the opposite party, such as by a deposition inquir-
ing into a transaction with the deceased; 78 and (2) when the testimony of
the decedent was offered by the one entitled to the protection of the stat-
ute.79 The court reasoned that neither of the exceptions existed in Lewis
because it was the plaintiff, not the defendant, the party entitled to the
protection of the statute, that offered the testimony of the decedent. The
court of civil appeals also held that Mrs. Foster's service of requests for
admissions and interrogatories on the plaintiff prior to her death did not
constitute a waiver. Relying on the per curiam opinion of the Texas
Supreme Court in Fleming v. Baylor University Medical Center,80 the court
concluded that at the time of pre-trial discovery, Mrs. Foster was still alive;
accordingly, the executor was not a party to the lawsuit, and the dead
man's statute therefore had no application. 8'
The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of civil appeals
75. Id at 401.
76. Foster v. Lewis, 607 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980), rev'd, 621
S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1981).
77. 607 S.W.2d at 609.
78. Id, see, e.g., Chandler v. Welborn, 156 Tex. 312, 294 S.W.2d 801 (1956); 1 R. RAY,
supra note 21, § 334.
79. 607 S.W.2d at 609-10; see, e.g., O'Neill v. Brown, 61 Tex. 34 (1884); 1 R. RAY, supra
note 21 § 335.
80. 554 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), writ refdn.r.e. per curiam, 561 S.W.2d 797
(Tex. 1977). For a discussion of this decision, see Beck, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 397, 411 (1979).
81. The court of civil appeals posed the following questions in denying application of
the waiver principles:
[H]ow can there be a waiver of a right that does not exist? If a court is to say
that an executor waived a valuable right, should it not first be required that
the executor be a party to the suit and participate in the conduct which re-
sulted in the waiver?
607 S.W.2d at 611.
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and affirmed the judgment of the trial court for two reasons.8 2 First, the
decedent previously had testified fully as to the transaction in question;
therefore, one of the main purposes of the statute, to prevent one party
from taking advantage of the fact that the lips of the deceased have been
sealed, was satisfied. The supreme court reasoned that "the legislature did
not intend for the statute to disqualify the survivor from testifying about
that transaction so long as the deceased's testimony is available to both
parties and both sides to the suit had an opportunity to examine the de-
ceased as to the transaction when the testimony was given. .' 83 Secondly,
when the plaintiffs attorney originally offered the deceased's testimony,
the executor did not object; thus, even if the dead man's statute was con-
sidered applicable, the executor had waived his objection by failing to ob-
ject properly.8 4
The meaning of the phrase "opposite party" contained in the dead
man's statute was raised in Womack v. First National Bank.85 In Womack
a bank brought suit against two brothers to recover on five promissory
notes. The bank alleged that the brothers were individually liable or, al-
ternatively, that the notes were partnership obligations executed by one
brother on behalf of the two brothers' partnership. One of the brothers,
Charles McClanahan, admitted liability in a pleading and acknowledged
that the notes were partnership obligations. Prior to trial, the other
brother, H. Lane McClanahan, died. On appeal the decedent's adminis-
trator argued that the trial court erred in allowing Charles McClanahan,
the brother of the decedent, to testify about conversations or transactions
with the decedent. The basis for the objection was that, by admitting lia-
bility and aligning himself with the plaintiff in his pleadings, the witness
made his testimony inadmissible. The court of civil appeals held that the
dead man's statute rendered Charles McClanahan, as a party to the action,
initially incompetent to testify about any transaction with his deceased
brother.86 The court also indicated that when one party calls the "opposite
party" to the stand and asks him about a transaction with the decedent, the
statute is waived. Since the bank called Charles McClanahan as an ad-
verse party, the bank waived applicability of the statute. The decedent's
administrator argued that the bank could not waive the decedent's rights
under the statute by calling Charles McClanahan because the witness was
not adverse to the bank. The court of civil appeals recognized that "some
controversy has arisen over the meaning of 'opposite party' where one de-
82. 621 S.W.2d at 404.
83. Id
84. Additionally, the parties previously had stipulated that Mrs. Foster's testimony "can
and will be used in future proceedings in lieu of her deposition." Id This stipulation was
without qualification or reservation of any objections. The supreme court considered the
stipulation binding on the executor. Smith v. Burroughs, 34 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1931, writ dism'd), held otherwise, and therefore the supreme court disapproved that
holding because it "is not consistent with other cases on waiver." 621 S.W.2d at 404.
85. 613 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
86. Id at 556.
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fendant has an interest adverse to that of his co-defendant. '8 7 The court
concluded, however, that the prevailing view seemed to be that "opposite
party" meant the opposite party of record and that when the other party
called the opposite party to testify, he became competent. 88
III. PRIVILEGE
Confidential communications between attorney and client ordinarily are
privileged and inadmissible.89 Many other communications that are confi-
dential, either because of the relationship of the parties or a pledge of se-
crecy, are not privileged, and thus are admissible. For example, in
Granvielv. Estelle,90 a habeas corpus case, the evidence demonstrated that
prior to his criminal conviction the appellant's counsel contacted Dr. Hol-
brook, a psychiatrist, and requested that he examine the appellant. Present
at the examinations were the psychiatrist, the appellant, and the appel-
lant's legal counsel. After these examinations, the appellant filed a motion
with the trial court to have Dr. Holbrook appointed to examine the appel-
lant again. The trial court granted this motion. At the guilt phase of his
trial, the prosecution subpoenaed Dr. Holbrook, who testified that the ap-
pellant was sane.
The appellant claimed that Dr. Holbrook's examination was necessary
for his defense of insanity, and that failure to request an examination
would have been ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellant further
contended that by employing Dr. Holbrook he created an involuntary
state's witness who gave testimony adverse to him. The court of appeals
rejected the appellant's agency-based contention, concluding that by filing
a motion to have the trial court appoint Dr. Holbrook as an expert, the
doctor became the court's disinterested expert, who was subject to being
called as a witness by either party.9' The court stated that no attorney-
87. Id
88. The court of civil appeals also stated that even if the bank could waive the statute by
calling Charles McClanahan as an adverse witness, his testimony could not have been ad-
missible aainst his brother's estate. The right of McClanahan's administrator to object
could not be waived by another party to the suit. Since appellant failed to raise the point
sufficiently on appeal, the court declined to decide the question. Id
89. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.10 (Vernon 1979) states that: "an attorney at law
shall not disclose a communication made to him by his client during the existence of that
relationship, nor disclose any other fact which came to the knowledge of such attorney by
reason of such relationship." The court in Williams v. Williams, 108 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, no writ), stated: "This provision is a statutory declaration of the
commonlaw rule of evidence and it applies to both criminal and civil cases." The privilege
can, however, be waived. West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1978) (when attorney's pro-
fessional conduct challenged by client, privilege waived as necessary to defend attorney's
character). See, e.g., Suddarth v. Poor, 546 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (communication concerning will preparation privileged); Ledisco Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ) (attor-
ney-client privilege does not exist if statement made in presence of third person); Miller v.
Pierce, 361 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1962, no writ) (privilege continues to
exist even after death of either attorney or client; heirs may claim privilege).
90. 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981).
91. Id at 682. TEx. CODE CaIM. PROC. art. 46.02, § 3(a) (Vernon 1979) provides that
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client privilege existed to prevent Dr. Holbrook from testifying because
under Texas law the attorney-client privilege did not attach in such a situ-
ation.92 Although the court recognized that other courts had adopted the
rule advocated by the appellant, 93 it held that its sole responsibility was to
determine whether such privilege was constitutionally required. 94 The
court of appeals relied on Edney v. Smith, 95 another habeas corpus case,
which applied the test of whether the balance drawn by the state rule "is so
detrimental to the attorney's effective representation of his client as to be
prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. ' 96 The court held that the Texas rule
on balance did not violate the sixth amendment.
97
The applicability of the patient-physician privilege was at issue in Jones
v. State9" when a patient in a state hospital appealed from the trial court's
judgment temporarily commiting her to the state hospital. The commit-
ment order was attacked on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting
the testimony of the patient's physician because the physician's testimony
was based upon privileged communications. The patient contended that
Texas statutory law99 provided that communications between a mental pa-
tient and a professional were confidential. The statute, however, also pro-
vides that disclosure of such communications is permissible if the patient is
informed in advance that the communications will not be privileged, and
the patient thereafter makes communications to a professional in the
course of a court-ordered examination. 100 In Jones the evidence was un-
disputed that the physician did not inform the appellant that her commu-
nications with him would not be privileged. Other evidence, however,
indicated that the patient had been informed by an employee in the admis-
sions office of the state hospital that her communications with mental
health professionals during her period of treatment would not be privi-
leged for the purpose of future proceedings. Nevertheless, the patient con-
tended that the statute required the physician to advise her of that fact.
The court of civil appeals overruled the patient's contention and stated
that the statute required only that patients be informed that communica-
tions with mental health professionals were not privileged; it did not re-
the court may appoint disinterested qualified experts to examine the defendant as to his
competence to stand trial and to testify at trial on that issue.
92. 655 F.2d at 682.
93. See, e.g., San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951); Lind-
say v. Lipson, 367 Mich. 1, 116 N.W.2d 60 (1962).
94. 655 F.2d at 682.
95. 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977).
96. 655 F.2d at 683 (citing Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1053 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
af'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977)).
97. The court stated that it was especially driven to this outcome because the appellant
refused to cooperate with the experts who were appointed at the prosecutor's request. 655
F.2d at 683.
98. 613 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
99. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5561(h) (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides a limited
privilege for confidential communications from patient to psychotherapist.
100. Id § 4(a)(4).
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quire that the physician himself provide such advice.101
IV. IMPEACHMENT
There are many ways to impeach a witness or refute a party's contention
of fact. 102 In criminal cases a common method of refuting the defendant's
contention that he was incorrectly identified as a party to a crime is to
bolster the trial testimony of the prosecution's identification witness. A
second witness is called to testify that the prosecution's identification wit-
ness previously identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime
while the defendant was in police custody. The prevailing rule is that a
witness who has identified a defendant at trial may also testify that he
identified the defendant on another occasion while the defendant was in
police custody.10 3 It has also been held that this type of testimony, if
unimpeached, may not be bolstered by the testimony of others.1 4 When
the defendant impeaches or attempts to impeach the testimony of the iden-
tifying witness, however, the testimony of a third party as to the witness's
extra judicial identification is admissible.10 5
The prosecution used this technique in a case reported during the survey
period. In Franklin v. State' °6 the defendant appealed from a criminal
conviction contending that (1) the trial court erroneously permitted the
prosecution to bolster the allegedly unimpeached testimony of identifica-
tion witnesses, and (2) his own post-arrest silence was unlawfully used
against him. Both prosecution witnesses originally testified that the de-
fendant was the man they saw at the scene of the crime, but neither witness
testified at the time as to any other extrajudicial identification they had
made of the defendant while he was in police custody. After the defense
rested its case, however, the prosecution called as a rebuttal witness a po-
lice officer, who testified that both witnesses had also picked defendant out
of a police line-up. The state then recalled the two witnesses who con-
firmed this testimony.
The defendant had sought to impeach the two witnesses with regard to
101. 613 S.W.2d at 571-72. The court's statements were directed specifically to the re-
quirements of TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5561(h), § 4(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
102. See Irvin, Admissibility of Defective Confessionsfor Impeachment Article 38.22 and
Harris v. New York, 11 HOUSTON L. REV. 193 (1973); Peeples, Prior Inconsistent Statements
and the Rule Against Impeachment of One's Own Witness: The Proposed Federal Rules, 52
TEXAS L. REV. 1383 (1974); Note, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 632 (1979); Note, 3 ST. MARY'S L.J.
361 (1971).
103. Williams v. State, 565 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Ward v. State, 427
S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Lyons v. State, 388 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
104. See, e.g., Lyons v. State, 388 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
105. Turner v. State, 486 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (police officer testifying
regarding witness' description of defendant); Frison v. State, 473 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971) (testimony of police officer regarding unimpeached witness's description of de-
fendant was admitted erroneously, but was rendered harmless by defendant's subsequent
attempt to impeach the witness); Beasley v. State, 428 S.W.2d 317 Tex. Crim. App. 1968)
(police officer permitted to testify regarding witness's identification of defendant in police
lineup).
106. 606 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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the opportunity each had to view him in the parking lot where he had been
identified. The statements by the witnesses at a pre-trial proceeding were
used in an attempt to prove inconsistencies in their testimony; conse-
quently, the court held that the defendant's efforts to impeach the testi-
mony warranted the admission of the officer's testimony as to extrajudicial
identifications. 0 7
The law is well settled that the prior silence of a witness as to a fact to
which he has already testified, when such silence occurred under circum-
stances in which he would be expected to speak out, may be used to im-
peach the witness during cross-examination.10 8 On the other hand, a
defendant in a criminal trial who testifies as to certain allegations may not
be impeached by his silence at the time of his arrest after receiving Mi-
randa warnings.1°9 In Franklin the defendant also challenged the trial
court's holding because the prosecution questioned him about his failure
to tell his exculpatory story at the preliminary hearings. The court of crim-
inal appeals overruled this contention and stated that unless prosecutors
were allowed some leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-examina-
tion, some defendants would be able to distort the factual picture."10 The
court held that when a criminal defendant takes the stand during pre-trial
proceedings and denies making a statement testified to by a prosecution
witness, he may be cross-examined as to why he did not deny making the
statement after the same testimony was given at earlier hearings. I"' The
court reasoned that the right of a defendant to present limited testimony at
a pre-trial hearing without waiving his fifth amendment rights" 2 did not
prohibit using knowingly false exculpatory statements made by the de-
fendant at such a hearing against him. Moreover, prior inconsistent state-
ments by the defendant to the police also might be used to impeach his
testimony, even though the statements were obtained in violation of the
defendant's Miranda rights and could not have been used by the state as
direct evidence of guilt. 1 3 The defendant was free to testify to, and had
the opportunity to testify to, the same exculpatory version of the facts at
the pre-trial hearing as he did later before the jury. The appellate court
therefore determined that the trial court did not err in permitting the state
to cross-examine the defendant before the jury as to why he had not re-
lated his exculpatory version of the facts in the pre-trial hearing.
On rehearing, the court concluded that its original opinion was incorrect
107. Id at 824.
108. 3A J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1042 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
109. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (prosecutor violated defendant's due process
rigts by cross-examining as to why he had not divulged exculpatory story to arrestingofficer).
110. 606 S.W.2d at 825.
111. Id
112. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
113. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (inculpatory statement made by defendant
to police before he had consulated with his attorney was admissable for impeachment pur-
poses); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement by defendant made before Mi-
randa warnings admissable for impeachment purposes).
[Vol. 36
EVIDENCE
both on "state evidentiary grounds and on constitutional grounds."" 4 The
court reasoned that the defendant had taken the stand at the pre-trial hear-
ings for a limited purpose and on issues to which his trial testimony was
not relevant. Consequently, the defendant's silence on a subject relevant
to his subsequent trial was not a' proper subject for impeachment. The
impeachment of the defendant was also improper (1) because it was error
to allow impeachment on a post-arrest silence if his silence was based on
an exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, and (2) because it
violated article 38.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure." 15
Another common form of impeachment is typified by the cross examina-
tion of the defendant in Bell v. State "16 in which the defendant appealed
his criminal conviction of aggravated robbery. After the state rested its
case in chief, the defendant adduced testimony from two defense witnesses
and then took the stand to testify on his own behalf. During his direct
examination, he was asked whether anything in his past was of a criminal
nature, and he replied in the affirmative." 7 He admitted that he had been
convicted of the felony offense of embezzlement and had been assessed a
sentence of two years. He further testified that he spent seven months in
the Department of Corrections and was then paroled. He stated that be-
cause he had no further problems, his sentence was discharged, and that
the embezzlement conviction was his only felony conviction. The remain-
der of his testimony dealt with his denial of the crime in question. On
cross-examination the prosecutor asked questions concerning a conviction
for the criminal offense of fleeing from police officers and about arrests for
charges of embezzlement and possession of marijuana. In replying to the
defendant's objection to exclude such testimony, the prosecutor contended
that the defendant had "opened the door for anything regarding criminal
activity." "18
The court of appeals initially held that, although the privilege against
self-incrimination may be waived by the defendant taking the witness
stand, the state's use of prior specific acts of misconduct committed by a
witness to reflect on his credibility was limited to the introduction of the
witness's final conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral tur-
114. 606 S.W.2d at 848.
115. Tax. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1979) provides that "[a]ny defend-
ant in a criminal action shall be permitted to testify in his own behalf therein, but the failure
of any defendant to so testify shall not be taken as a circumstance against him, nor shall the
same be alluded to or commented on by counsel in the cause."
116. 620 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
117. The testimony was as follows:
Q: [By Defense Counsel]: Did I advise you that should you take the stand
that the... Dstrict Attorney would go into your past, if there was anything
criminal in your past they would bring it out in front of the jury?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Have you anything in your past that is of a criminal nature?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Have you been down to what we call the joint, Texas Department of
Corrections?
Id at 119 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
118. Id at 120.
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pitude. 19 The court therefore reversed the trial court, holding it error to
admit before the jury proof of the appellant's misdemeanor conviction for
possession of marijuana, an offense that is not a crime involving moral
turpitude. On motion for rehearing, however, the court noted that its orig-
inal opinion erroneously construed the defendant's testimony as "going no
further than the general rule would have permitted the State to go.'
120
The court concluded that the defendant actually went further than he
should have if he desired to avoid impeachment, and therefore, the state
had a right to inquire about his arrest and conviction for the possession of
marijuana since the appellant had "'opened the door' on direct examina-
tion." 2' The court reasoned that the question asked and answered on di-
rect examination "could not have left any other impression with the jury
except that he had nothing in his criminal past except the embezzlement
conviction."1 22 The state's motion for rehearing was therefore granted,
and the judgment affirmed. 123
V. OPINION EVIDENCE
A. Competency
Whether the person offered by a party as an expert possesses the requi-
site qualifications is a preliminary question to be determined by the trial
court. 124 In GoldKist, Inc. v. Massey, 25 a deceptive trade case in which a
farmer brought suit against a seed dealer and a seed manufacturer to re-
cover his lost profits, the trial court permitted certain farmers to testify as
experts concerning the quality of the seed in dispute. The court thereafter
entered judgment for the farmer and awarded the dealer indemnity from
the corporate manufacturer. 26 One of the issues on appeal was whether
the trial court erred in allowing the peanut farmers, including the plaintiff,
to testify, as experts, that the peanut seed failed to germinate and was bad
seed. The defendant contended that the witnesses were not qualified as
experts. The court of civil appeals held that "[p]ractical experience is an
acceptable way of gaining expertise"' 27 sufficient to testify as an expert,
and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
the testimony of these witnesses as experts. 128
That an attorney may not inject his personal opinion into the trial of a
case is well established. 129 In Menefee v. State130 the defendant on appeal
119. Id
120. Id at 125.
121. Id at 126.
122. Id
123. Id at 127.
124. See 2 R. RAY, supra note 21, § 1401.
125. 609 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
126. Id at 646.
127. Id at 647.
128. Id
129. The Texas Supreme Court announced the permissible limits for an attorney in stat-
ing his opinion as to the truth of a witness's testimony in Southwestern Greyhound Lines v.
Dickson, 149 Tex. 587, 236 S.W.2d 115 (1951):
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contended that it was error for the prosecutor to tell the jury in his jury
argument: "I don't believe I have ever seen anybody that I thought was
anymore honest than she is.'1 31 The witness about whom the statement
was made was the only witness who could identify the defendant as the
person who committed the offense. On cross-examination, her credibility
had been subject to strong attack by defendant's counsel. The court held
that since the "jury argument injected the prosecutor's personal opinion of
her credibility,"' 32 reversible error occurred. The court reasoned that the
prosecutor's opinion of the witness's credibility would carry "undue weight
with the jury in light of the prosecutor's experience"1 33 and that the state-
ments of the prosecutor were merely "an effort to bolster [the witness's]
credibility by unsworn testimony."1 34
In Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp. ,35 a products liability case, the
trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal the defendant
attacked the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence, and argued that there
was no evidence of any defect in the cow milking system. The plaintiff had
offered no evidence specifically identifying a defect either of design or
manufacture, and had offered no evidence of the product's condition when
it left the defendant's hands. The plaintiffs evidence basically showed
only that his cows developed mastitis after he purchased two additional
milking units from the defendant. Only one witness was called by the
plaintiff to discuss the presence of a defect in the milking equipment. The
witness testified that "milking machines in general cause mastitis, prima-
rily by what is commonly known as 'slippage,' which is the introduction of
air between the cow's teat and the milking machine inflation,"1 36 but he
also admitted that mastitis could be caused by many factors other than
milking machines. The expert witness had not conducted any tests on the
milking machines or on the cattle, nor did he or anyone else investigate to
determine whether "slippage" was the cause of the mastitis in the defend-
Undoubtedly there is no absolute rule against expressing even a highly unfa-
vorable opinion of an opposing party or witness .... But the salutory right
of counsel thus to speak his mind is subject to obvious limits, which excessive
language may exceed--either by connoting an idea or fact without support in
the record or by its very character as inflammatory .... While argument
otherwise excessive or improper under the above rules has been held justified
by similar argument or other type of invitation previously emanating from the
opposing side, obviously this is so only when the relation between the argument
under attack and the alleged pro vocation is one of reason andfairness.
Id at 119 (emphasis added; citation deleted). While Southwestern Greyhound reflected the
court's intolerance for prejudicial or inflammatory attorney comments about witnesses, the
later decision of Morgan v. Luna, 337 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, no writ),
prescribes the boundaries of attorney commentary when inflammatory language is not in
issue. In Morgan the court upheld the propriety of an attorney's attack upon a witness and
upon that witness's testimony. Id at 143.
130. 614 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).




135. 639 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1981).
136. Id. at 1326.
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ant's cows. He also expressly admitted that he did not have the expertise
to express an opinion as to the inadequacy of the design or mechanics of
the milking machine.' 37 The court thereupon reversed and remanded,
holding that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the
jury's finding of a defect. 138
VI. PROBATIVE VALUE
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a district court
may exclude evidence, even if relevant, "if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."' 39 In Ballou v. Henri
Studios, Inc. ,14 the application of this rule was called directly into issue.
After judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs as survivors of the
decedent, the defendant argued that the exclusion of blood test results in-
dicating that the deceased automobile driver Ballou was intoxicated at the
time of the collision and thereby contributorily negligent, constituted re-
versible error. The trial court had considered the issue on motion in
limine, and excluded such evidence because it believed that the prejudicial
potential substantially outweighed the probative value. 141 The results of
the blood alcohol test were viewed as unreliable by the court because one
witness testified that Ballou was not intoxicated a few minutes before the
collision while another witness testified that it would probably take at least
one hour of alcohol consumption to reach a blood alcohol level of 0.24
percent. 142
The court of appeals held that as a matter of law the potential for unfair
prejudice of the blood alcohol test did not substantially outweigh its pro-
bative value, and therefore excluding the results of the test was an abuse of
discretion requiring a reversal of the trial court's judgment and a new
trial. 143 The court reasoned that the district court made an "impermissible
credibility choice"' 44 by deciding to believe another witness's testimony
rather than the results of a blood alcohol test. The appellate court con-
cluded that in conducting the balancing test required by rule 403, the trial
court was not authorized to exclude evidence because the judge did not
find it credible; on the contrary, the district court should have determined
the probative value of the test results if true, and weighed that probative
137. The court of appeals also noted that the plaintiff failed to rebut any of the defend-
ant's evidence that the milking machine purchased by the plaintiff was designed in such a
manner that, if properly used, it would decrease rather than increase the incidence of masti-
tis. Id
138. For an excellent discussion of this general area of the law, see Calvert, "No Evi-
dence" and "Insuficient Evidence" Points oError, 38 TExAs L. REV. 361 (1960).
139. FED. R. EVID. 403.
140. 656 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1981).
141. The court determined that the evidence of Ballou's intoxication would be too harm-
ful and overly prejudicial to the plaintiff because "it is never possible to judge the attitude of
a Jury and how they are affected by the subject of alcohol." Id at 1152.
142. Id at 1154.
143. Id at 1155.
144. Id at 1154.
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value against the danger of unfair prejudice. The court of appeals, there-
fore, held that the trial court should have left to the jury the difficult choice
of whether to credit the evidence, and the failure to do so constituted re-
versible error. 14 5
VII. EVIDENCE OF GROss NEGLIGENCE
The most significant evidence case decided during the survey period was
Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls.146 Burk Royalty was an action brought against
the employer of the plaintiffs deceased husband, in which gross negligence
in the death of the plaintiffs husband was alleged. The trial court entered
judgment for the plaintiff based on the jury's verdict. The court of civil
appeals reformed the amount of the judgment and remanded to the trial
court to allocate the award between the plaintiff and her son.' 47
The principal issue on appeal was whether there was evidence to support
the jury's finding that the defendant's district superintendent, Swetnam,
was grossly negligent. The evidence demonstrated that the fatal fire oc-
curred while the decedent was working as a member of a four-man crew
that was pulling wet tubing from an oil well so that the pump at the bot-
tom could be replaced and production restored. On the date of the acci-
dent, the defendant's operator in charge of the well had intended to locate
the toolpusher in charge of the crew to find out precisely how the crew
should remove the fluid trapped in the tubing. Swetnam had driven out to
deliver the crew's paychecks and the operator asked him instead. The op-
erator suggested that an explosive charge be dropped in the well to blow a
hole in the tubing to allow the fluid to drain out at the bottom. Swetnam
told the operator not to use that method, but instead suggested that the
tubing be pulled until they reached the fluid, and then that they "swab"
the remainder of the tubing in the hole. During the conversation,
Swetnam said nothing about safety. He remained in his car, and did not
check for fire extinguishers or any other safety equipment. The crew be-
gan pulling the tubing as suggested by Swetnam. The decedent's job was
to take the sections of pipe as they were pulled up and place them in a
rack. He was working approximately twenty-five feet up in the derrick
above the floor of the well and had a safety belt strapped around his shoul-
ders and waist that was attached to the derrick to prevent him from falling.
After pulling approximately twenty dry pieces of pipe, the crew reached
tubing that was full of fluid. Before the next joint of pipe could be pulled,
pressurized gas escaped, causing oil to spew out of the tubing up into the
derrick. As a result, the decedent was covered with oil. The leaked gas
ignited and flames shot to the top of the derrick, igniting the oil on the
145. This is not to imply that the court is attempting to restrict a trial judge's discretion in
the realm of probative value. A key distinction must be made, however, between probative
value and credibility. The judge in Ballou simply crossed the boundary from the former to
the latter, thereby usurping the jury's right to believe or disbelieve such relevant evidence.
Id
146. 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
147. Id at 914.
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decedent, who struggled to get out of his safety belt, but was unable to do
so. Because there were no fire extinguishers on the rig, the crew was un-
able to extinguish the fire on the decedent, and he burned to death. On the
basis of this evidence, the jury determined that Swetnam "'failed to follow
approved safety practices for pulling wet tubing,' ",148 and that this failure
constituted gross negligence.
The court of civil appeals held that there was "some evidence" to sup-
port the jury's finding of gross negligence: The court further held that
there was "some evidence" that the defendant's negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the decedent's death, because Swetnam failed " 'to have
available at prescribed positions the two (2) fire extinguishers prescribed
by paragraph No. 14 of the company safety rules.' "149 The defendants
contended that there was no evidence of such an "entire want of care" on
the part of Swetnam as would amount to "conscious indifference" to sup-
port an award of exemplary damages. 150 In addition, the defendants ar-
gued that although Swetnam was in charge of safety, it was not his
responsibility to perform the task of positioning the fire extinguishers.
They also contended that there was no evidence that Swetnam knew or
should have known that there were no fire extinguishers properly posi-
tioned at the well.151
After stating that the development of the concept of gross negligence in
Texas has been "somewhat confusing,"' 52 the Texas Supreme Court dis-
cussed the historical development of that concept. The court determined
that the "no evidence" test applied in testing jury findings of fact issues
should also be applied in reviewing gross negligence findings. In such situ-
ations, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was grossly negligent; if
the jury should find gross negligence then the defendant must bear the
burden of establishing that there was "no evidence" to support the find-
ing.' 53 The supreme court concluded that the long-accepted "some care"
test improperly reversed that burden. Under the "some care" test, the de-
fendant, instead of proving that there was "no evidence" to support the
verdict, only needed to show that there was "some evidence" that did not
support the jury finding of gross negligence. The burden was thus shifted
to the plaintiff to negate the existence of "some care."' 54 Stating that since
no justification existed for having a different standard for reviewing gross
148. Id
149. Id. at 915.
150. Id The instruction on gross negligence and the definition of "heedless and reckless
disregard" were not attacked by the defendants. Id
151. The defendants relied on a number of cases that held that if "some care" was exer-
cised there could not be "an entire want of care"; thus, exemplary damages were improper.
Sheffield Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964); Bennett v. Howard,
141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943); Delgadillo v. Tex-Con Util. Contractors, Inc., 526
S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Loyd Elec. Co. v. DeHoyos, 409
S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. At .- San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd).
152. 616 S.W.2d at 9.
153. Id at 920-21.
154. Id at 921. The court stated that the burden was "almost an impossible task since
anything may amount to some care." Id
[Vol. 36
EVIDENCE
negligence findings in employer cases, the supreme court disapproved the
use of the "some care" test, and overruled those cases that had applied
it. 155 After reviewing the evidence favorable to the jury's finding of gross
negligence, the court held that there was evidence upon which the jury
could have based its finding of gross negligence and affirmed the appellate
court decision.
Although the majority concluded that the definition of gross negligence
as reaffirmed by the supreme court in Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corp.
v. Jones156 was correct, that definition has been significantly altered under
the new test. Appellate review will now require the reviewing court to
(1) consider only the evidence viewed in the most favorable light tending
to support the jury finding of gross negligence and (2) disregard all evi-
dence of care. In fact, the court's decision in Burk Royalty constitutes an
abandonment of the long-settled definition of "gross negligence," i.e. an
entire want of care, and effectively results in the disappearance of the dis-
tinction between ordinary negligence and gross negligence.
155. Justice McGee wrote an opinion dissenting from this decision and Justices Denton
and Barrow joined in that opinion. Id at 927. Advocating the "some care" standard of
proof, the dissent traced the historical development of the confused state of the law. Un-
daunted by such criticism, the majority emphasized that "[w]hen there is some evidence of
defendant's want of care and also some evidence of 'some care' by the defendant, the jury's
finding of gross negligence through entire want of care resolves the issue, and the appellate
court is bound by the finding in testing for legal insufficiency." Id at 921.
156. 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
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